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SOVIET POLICY
ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR
SEVINC CARLSON*

Soviet policy regarding the sea-bed should be viewed in the light of its
growing oceanographic fleet, fishing fleet, merchant marine, and navy.
During the last decade, the USSR has changed from basically a land
power to both a land and a respectable sea power.
Parity with the United States has been achieved in the field of
oceanography. The Russian oceanographic fleet is presently the largest
in size and tonnage in the world, consisting of ships designed to operate
in a variety of climates, performing complex and specialized research. 1
The fishing fleet of the USSR is also the largest and the most modern
in the world. It is technologically superior to that of the United States,
having been developed under a policy of commitment to expansion in
exploitation of the ocean's fisheries. After the 7-Year Plan of 1959-1965,
a new Soviet 5-Year Plan for the development of the fishing industry
was adopted in 1966. According to this plan, a 50% increase over the
1965 fishery ladings, or a total of 8,500,000 tons by 1970 was expected. It
was anticipated that close to 90% of this catch would come from areas of
the high seas, far from Soviet coastal waters. 2
The Soviet merchant fleet, too, is continually growing, 3 presently
ranking sixth among the world's merchant marine fleets. Dedication to
growth and expansion is readily evidenced by the fact that 80% of the
Soviet fleet is less than ten years old.
As for the Soviet navy, it is the second largest, and, perhaps, the most
modern navy in the world, making its presence felt in all parts of the
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globe. 4 The growth and development of a modern navy has been a
somewhat recent phenomenon for the USSR, occurring most
significantly in the last decade. Soviet policy towards law of the sea
matters, then, is naturally influenced by these factors. The push
towards an ever-expanding role in the world's oceans, engendered
primarily in the national interest, clearly colors the Soviet views, as
expressed in current international discussions.
THE RESERVATION OF THE SEA-BED AND
THE OcEAN FLOOR FoR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES
After the Malta proposal of August 17, 1967, and during the
examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful
purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, the approach of the USSR has been one of caution and
emphasis on the need for further study before the formulation of a
principle to regulate the use of the ocean floor and its resources. The
primary need, according to the USSR, is for careful preparatory study,
the collection of data, and the coordination of existing studies and
activities. Its representatives have emphasized that the study should be
carried out by the States, themselves, with the assistance of the
Secretary General and the Secretariat of the United Nations. 5 The
Soviet delegation did not favor the creation of an ad hoc committee,
fearing that it would lay the foundation for the establishment of a
future permanent organ. It did not oppose the resolution calling for the
creation of such a committee, however, expecting that the committee's
purpose and activities would be severely limited b:v the terms of the
draft resolution itself. 6
In a later session, the USSR displayed its cautionary approach b:v
abstaining from the voting on the resolution of December 21, 1968,
which created a permanent 42-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation
voted against the draft resolution of the same date requesting a stud:v
by the Secretary General on the establishment of international
machinery to explore and exploit the resources of the sea-bed and ocean
floor and the convening in 1972 of a Conference on the Law of the Sea. 7
4. SOVIET SEA POWER, supra note 1, at 31-50; Rise of Soviet Sea Power, ORDNANCE, Jan .Feb. 1970, at 394-98; SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION, WORLD SURVEY, Main Series, London, Feb.
1971, at 1-20.
5. U.N. Doc. AI C. 1/PV. 1544, at 31. 32-35 (1967).
6. U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1544, at 32-35, 38-40 0967).
7. G.A . Res. 2749 <XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 24, U .N . Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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According to the USSR delegation: (1) appropriate conditions for the
establishment of international machinery did not exist; (2) essential
scientific data were lacking; (3) it was not clear how profitable the
industrial development of sea-bed resources would prove in the near
future; and (4) a more advanced technological means of exploration and
exploitation at great depths without harm to the marine environment
would have to be developed.
The Soviet delegation expressed dissent at the idea of granting
jurisdiction over the sea-bed to an international machinery. Thus, Soviet
policy has reflected opposition to authorization for the international
machinery to carry out exploration and exploitation of sea-bed
resources, since, in the final analysis, it might "beco.me a capitalistic
undertaking and the tool of monopolies ." Rather, its role, as envisioned
by the Soviet policy-makers, should be limited to assisting countries in
carrying out such exploration and exploitation in the interests of all
mankind. The Soviet delegation felt, moreover, that it would be futile to
attempt to establish the structure of such machinery before the
conclusion of a universal, international agreement on a sea-bed regime. 8
During the August, 1970, meeting of the Sea-bed Committee in Geneva,
Mr. Smirnow asked the United States delegate whether he could accept
the formula for "an international treaty of a universal character." The
U.S. delegate, Mr. Thacher, said he would prefer a formula on the
order of being "as universal as possible," a premise which Mr .
Smirnow found unacceptable. 9
The Soviet delegates have stressed that a number of specific norms of
International Law can already be applied to the sea-bed, making
uncritical the construction of new formulations. Among those identified
were: (1) the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of
the high seas; (2) the right to engage in "fisheries" conducted by mean s
of equipment embedded in the floor of the sea under circumstances
specified in Article 13 of the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas; (3) the freedom of scientific
research; (4) respect for the legal rights and interests of other states; (5)
respect for the generall y recognized freedoms of the high seas, including
the freedom of navigation and fishing; and, poss ibly, (6) denuclearization of the sea-bed. 10
The international responsibility for insuring the conservation of the
mineral resources, prevention of pollution, pre vention of the creation of

8. U.N. Doc. A/ AC. 138/SR. 29-44 at 16-17, 129-84, 187-96 ( 1970).
9. Id. at 189 0970).
10. Butler, Some Recent Developments in Soviet Maritime Law, 4
706-707 (1970).
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unjustified obstacles, and the insuring of the safety of the personnel
should, according to the Soviet delegation, be borne by the states. As to
the establishment of an international machinery, the Soviet delegation
enumerated conditions which it insists such machinery should meet,
such as: (1) It must be open to participation by all states without any
discrimination and in accordance with the principle of sovereign
equality, regardless of whether or not the state is a member of the
United Nations or its specialized agencies; (2) It must exclude an~·
possibility of activities being carried out in the interests of single states
to the detriment of other states; (3) It must insure that the obligations
undertaken by participating states are carried out fully and must
promote the rational development of sea-bed resources, in particular
through the introduction and application of new technology; (4) Finally,
it must prevent the plundering and pollution of the marine
environment. 11
In relation to the question of the need to insure within the framework
of the international regime to be established, an equitable sharing of
the proceeds and benefits resulting from the exploitation of marine
resources, the USSR delegate, Mr. Kulazhenkov, reiterated his
delegation's view that the question of benefits should be studied within
the framework of preparation of an agreement on the international
regime. It was regarded as essential to have some definite basis for the
sharing of benefits and not to formulate hasty conclusions. As there
were different conceptions of what would be equitable, Mr.
Kulazhenkov said that the term "equitable sharing" would have to be
carefully studied. The USSR believed that the benefits should be
available to all mankind and not merely to particular segments of the
world population. 12
As to the question of granting licenses, the Soviet delegation pointed
out that the proposed system for granting licenses was incomplete and
might even be harmful to the interests of many states. Four t~· pes of
licensing had been proposed: (1) licensing on a first-come, first-served
basis; (2) licensing by lottery; (3) licensing on the basis of the
applicant's qualifications; (4) licensing on the basis of the highest
bidder. In addition, some delegations had proposed that licenses should
be granted not only to states, but also to private companies. According
to the Soviet delegation, all those terms of licensing would, in practice,
give an advantage to particular groups of countries and monopolies and
would serve the narrow interests of individual states and companies
rather than those of mankind as a whole.
11. U.N. Doc . A/ AC . 138/SR. 29-44 at 95 (1970).
12. Id. at 184-85, 197 (1970).
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In the Soviet view, licensing was only one of the many complex
questions relating to the international machinery which remained to be
solved and which required further, careful, and detailed study.1 3 In a
statement made by the USSR representative in the Economic and
Technical Sub-committee of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, the need to base the economic and technical
conditions and rules for the exploitation of the resources of the deep
sea-bed on fuller information was stressed. Further, it was emphasized
that these conditions and rules should form part of an international
agreement on a regime for the exploitation of the mineral resources of
the sea-bed. The Soviet delegation considered it necessary in
determining the nature of operations to distinguish between the
following: (1) surveys for scientific purposes; (2) surveys for industrial
purposes; and (3) industrial exploitation of deposits of mineral raw
materials by any technological means. 14
Another point consistently stressed by the USSR delegation and
included in the Soviet draft of March 18, 1969, on Prohibition of the Use
for Military Purposes of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and the
Subsoil Thereof, has been the necessity for halting all military activity
in the sea-bed. The Soviet delegation emphasized the great significance
which the USSR attaches to the use of the sea-bed exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The Soviet draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Use for
Military Purposes of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil
Thereof prohibited the placement on the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and
the subsoil thereof of objects with nuclear weapons or any other
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the setting up of military bases,
structures, installations, fortifications, and other objects of a military
nature. 15
The USSR was one of the sixty-two nations that signed the Treaty on
the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof in Washington, on February 11, 1971. 16
During the course of 1971, the USSR submitted to the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, provisional draft articles of a treaty on the use
of the seabed for peaceful purposes that included the points previously
made. The USSR delegation, in the explanatory note submitted by
13. Id. at 95.
14. U.N. Doc. AlAC. 138/SC.2/SR 35-40 at 29-30 (1970).
15. Hearings on S.Res. 33 Before the Subcomm. on Ocean Space of the Comm.
on Foreign Re/,ations, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 16-17 (1969).
16. 64 DEP'T STATE BULL., 288-90 (1971).
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them, pointed out that the present draft did not contain "provisons
regarding issues relating to licenses for industrial exploration and
exploitation of seabed resources and distribution of benefits" but
"merely noted the existence of these issues" (articles 9 and 14).
According-to the Soviet delegation, these issues are "closely linked with
the problems of establishment of the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea,
the securing of freedom of passage through straits used for
international navigation, and fishing in waters adjacent to the
territorial sea." The USSR delegation would be prepared to submit
specific texts of the articles still outstanding in its draft, "should a
solution of the latter problems be in sight" so that "an agreement on
these matters can be reached as a package deal." 17
Soviet bloc geologists who met in a four-day conference in the Baltic
Sea Port of Riga in April, 1971 decided to have an ambitious program to
survey for and extract valuable minerals found on the ocean floor. They
agreed to form an International Coordinating Center of Marine
Exploration in the Soviet Union to insure "rational use of mineral
resources of the oceans." The Center would be open to the members of
COMECON (The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) and joint
expeditions would be undertaken to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to
select prospective sites for mineral exploitation. 18
CONCLUSIONS

The policy of the USSR towards an international regime governing
the uses of the deep sea-bed is still undergoing an evolution. Like most
other countries, the USSR is taking a rather cautious approach to this
new and important concern. The Soviet view, as reflected in the
statements of the Soviet delegations to the United Nations, is to
initially resolve by international agreement all questions concerning
the width of territorial waters and the precise outer limits of the
continental shelf. In this respect, the Soviet and United States policies
seem to coincide. As contrasted to the United States, however, the
USSR appears to be opposed to the establishment of international
machinery to explore and exploit the sea-bed resources. It prefers that
this exploration and exploitation be carried out by the States,
themselves.
Since the Soviet Union has established its power in the world's
oceans, it has seemingly been loathe to sacrifice its hard-earned
superiority. It is to be hoped that as the discussions continue, the USSR
and the United States will find further areas of agreement, enabling the
use of deep sea resources for the "common heritage of mankind."
17. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/8421 (1971).
18. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1971, at 10, col. C.
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